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Clark: Clark: Expanded Waiver of Marital Privileges in Missouri

EXPANDED WAIVER OF
MARITAL PRIVILEGES IN MISSOURI
Slate v. Pendergras'
In 1977,2 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District attempted to significantly alter the spousal privileges in criminal cases by vesting
the testimonial privilege entirely in the witness-spouse. 3 This decision was
later overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court.4 But in a recent decision,
the western district court of appeals again may have significantly changed
the status of the privileges in Missouri. In State v. Pendergras,5 the court has
apparently created a new exception to the related marital privilege of confidential communications.
The case arose when, following a marital dispute, the defendant's wife
reported to police that he was in possession of narcotics. The police discovered
marijuana and cocaine in a satchel on the defendant's premises and in the
trunk of his car. During the trial, the defendant testified that, because of
marital problems, he had not resided at the family home for two weeks before
his arrest. He claimed that the car had been under his wife's control during
that period and that the satchel was hers. He denied any knowledge of the
6
drugs.
The state called the defendant's wife in rebuttal. 7 She testified that he
had never moved out of the house, that he had the only key to the car, and
that the satchel was his. 8 She also testified that she had seen the defendant
using narcotics on the premises and recounted certain confidential statements
made to her by the defendant regarding his case. 9 The defendant was convicted and he appealed.
1. 621 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
2. State v. Frazier, 550 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
3. Id. at 595.
4. State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Bane 1979). TheEuellcourt relied
heavily on Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), to support its conclusion that the testimonial privilege should be vested in the defendant-spouse as well
as the witness-spouse. 583 S.W.2d at 177. The United States Supreme Court overruled Hawkins shortly thereafter in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
5. 621 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
6. Id. at 69.
7. Id. The defendant objected to his wife's testimony on the ground that it
was privileged. Id. at 70.
8. Id. at 69-70.
9. The wife testified that the defendant had asked her to commit perjury by
testifying that "she had set him up," and had bribed his chief witness. Brief for
Respondent at 6, State v. Pendergras, 621 S.W.2d 68 (1981). The defendant's wife
also testified that he told her he had used cocaine. Id.
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The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting
the wife's testimony. The defendant argued that the testimony was inadmissible under section 546.260 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,10 which
provides that a defendant may exclude the adverse testimony of his spouse
in a criminal case"1 and any confidential communications between the
spouses. 12
The court of appeals held that the defendant had waived his privilege
by attempting to show that his wife was responsible for the narcotics, thereby
blackening her reputation.1 3 The court relied on State v. Bledsoe14 to support
its decision.15 In Bledsoe, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a defendant, by revealing confidential communications between himself and his
spouse and blackening her reputation, waived his privilege to exclude her
testimony' 6 The defendants in both Bledsoe and Pendergrashad objected to
their spouses' testimony on the basis of section 546.260.11
10. (1978). This statute provides:
No person shall be incompetent to testify as a witness in any criminal cause
or prosecution by reason of being the person on trial or examination, or
by reason of being the husband or wife of the accused... ; provided, that
no person on trial or examination, nor wife or husband of such person,
shall be required to testify, but any such person may, at the option of the
defendant, testify in his behalf ... ; provided, that in no case shall husband or wife, when testifying under the provisions of this section for a defendant, be permitted to disclose confidential communications had or made
between them in the relation of such husband and wife.
11. See State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 792, 230 S.W.2d 845, 847 (1950).
12. See State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. En Banc 1979); Moore v.
Moore, 51 Mo. 118, 119 (1872). Confidential communications have been defined
as those communications exchanged between husband and wife when they are alone.
State v. Montgomery, 571 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). Thus, acommunication is not considered confidential, and no privilege exists, if a third party
is present at the time it is made. Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 674, 54 S.W. 473,
475 (1899); Tucker v. Tucker, 224 Mo. App. 669,674, 31 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Spr.
1930). See Comment, Testimony by Husbandand Wife in Missouri, 24 MO. L. REV.
546, 551 (1959). See also notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text supra.
13. 621 S.W.2d at 71. The court recounted the defendant's attempts to implicate his wife:
Q. It's your testimony that It's [sic] your wife's?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you think it was your wife's at that time?
A. Yes; or one of her friends.
A. I was thinking-I was thinking so much. It was just repetitious [sic].
I just started thinking who in the hell would come in the house and put
this stuff in here. Who would she let in the house.
Id. at 72 n.3.
14. 325 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1959).
15. 621 S.W.2d at 71.
16. 325 S.W.2d at 766.
17. See note 10 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/12
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It is important to realize that there are two independent privileges contained in the statute. The first is the testimonial privilege. 18 Its origin is
obscure; 19 it is often mentioned in conjunction with the common law rule
that a spouse was incompetent to testify on behalf of the other spouse. 20 The
testimonial privilege and spousal incompetency are not related, however,
21
and they must be kept conceptually distinct.
States apply the testimonial privilege in various ways. Some retain the
rule of incompetency that precludes adverse spousal testimony in criminal
cases. 22 Others, including Missouri, allow the defendant-spouse to control
the privilege. 23 A growing number of states permit only the witness-spouse
to assert the privilege.

24

This is the current federal rule.2 5 The remaining

jurisdictions have simply abolished the privilege entirely. 26
The modern rationale behind the testimonial privilege is a desire by the
courts to avoid placing undue strain on the defendant's marriage by requiring

18. This is the portion of the statute that says that no "wife or husband" of
a defendant "shall be required to testify" against him. Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.260
(1978).
19. Wigmore believes that the testimonial privilege originated around the middle of the sixteenth century. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (rev. ed. 1961 &
Supp. 1981). Interestingly, the common law rule of spousal incompetency, which
precluded one spouse from testifying on behalf of the other spouse, did not develop
until the early seventeenth century. Id. Modern law, which retains the testimonial
privilege but has abolished spousal disqualification in most jurisdictions, is actually
a reflection of the early common law.
20. Note, for example, that spousal incompetency is abolished in the first
clause of Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.260 (1978), the statute which later provides for the
testimonial privilege. See note 10 supra.
21. Despite the difference between incompetency and privilege, courts have
often refused to allow waiver of privileges, which transforms them into rules of incompetency. See, e.g., Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407, 12 S.W. 663 (1889) (no waiver
permitted, but confidential communications allowed under exception to privilege).
For a discussion of the view that incompetency and waiver are not absolute rules,
see J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 78-92 (1947).
22. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 622.7 (1979), construed in State v. Pepples, 250
N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1977); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODEANN. §538. 11 (Vernon 1979).
These jurisdictions recognize, however, the common law exception of necessity and
allow the spouse to testify when a crime has been committed against him. For
Missouri cases on this point, see note 35 infra.
23. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1975); note 10 supra.
24. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Cum. Supp. 1980), construedin Hall
v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 74, 215 S.W.2d 840 (1948); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5
15:461 (West 1981), construed in State v. Triplett, 313 So. 2d 227 (La. 1975).
25. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
26. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2424 (Cum. Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 155-1 (1969), construedin People v. Burton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 879, 286 N.E.2d
792 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 937 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §5 60-407, -428
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2103, 2501, 2504 (West Supp. 1979).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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one spouse to testify against the other. 27 Because the goal is to protect the
particular marriage involved, the privilege is not available if the marriage
ends before trial.

28

The second privilege is known as the communications privilege. 2 9 It
enables either spouse to exclude confidential communications made between
them during the marriage.3 0 The purpose of the communications privilege
is to encourage trust and security within the institution of marriage in
general, 31 a goal fundamentally different from that of the testimonial
privilege. The privilege performs this function by assuring spouses that the
confidences passing between them during marriage will be excluded from
the public forum of the courts. 32 The communications privilege is designed
to protect the privacy of all marriages, not just the one involved in the case,
33
and so it continues even after the marriage is dissolved.

27. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44(1980); 8J. WIGMORE, supra
note 19, § 2228. Missouri's strong commitment to the privilege is demonstrated
by State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 230 S.W.2d 845 (1950). In Dunbar, the defendanthusband shot his wife. A crime against the other spouse is a long-recognized exception to the privilege to exclude adverse testimony. See note 35 and accompanying text infra. Though she signed the complaint voluntarily, the wife refused to testify
at trial. The Missouri Supreme Court, following what it believed to be the
legislature's intent to safeguard the marital relationship, held that it was reversible error to compel the wife's testimony at trial. 360 Mo. at 792, 230 S.W.2d at
847. The case is discussed in CriminalLaw-Assault with Intent to Kill or Do Great Bodily
Harm-SpecificIntent-Powerto Compel Defendant's Wife to Testify Over His Objection,
17 Mo. L. REV. 90 (1952).
28. State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
29. This is the portion of the statute that provides that "in no case shall husband or wife ...

be permitted to disclose confidential communications ...

made

between them." Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.260 (1978).
30. Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151, 152 (1873); State v. Montgomery, 571
S.W.2d 784, 787 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978). This privilege is also recognized in civil
cases. See MO. REV. STAT. § 491.020 (1978).
31. See Dickensen v. Abernathy Furniture Co., 231 Mo. App. 303, 315, 96
S.W.2d 1086, 1094 (K.C. 1936); Miller v. Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418, 419 (St. L.
1883); 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2332.

32. SeeBerlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151, 152 (1873). In this respect, as in others,
the communications privilege is similar to the privileges provided to attorneys, physicians, and priests. See MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1978). Wigmore lists four criteria
for determining the usefulness of communications privileges in general: (1) the communication must originate in confidence; (2) the confidentiality must be essential
to the relationship; (3) the relationship must be a proper object for the law to encourage; and (4) the injury incurred by disclosure must be greater than the benefit
of a full investigation. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2232. All of these
characteristics are found in the spousal communications privilege. Id.
33. State v. Euell, 583 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. En Banc 1979), overrulingState
v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900). The Eudll court held that the testimonial
privilege ended with the termination of the marriage but was careful to distinguish
between the testimonial and communications privileges; the communications
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/12
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Historically, Missouri courts have applied the statute in accordance with
the common law.3 4 For many years, the only exception arose from necessity: when one spouse committed a crime against the other. 35 Waiver of
privileges was generally limited to those instances where the party controlling the privilege either consented to its waiver3 6 or failed to object at the
37
proper time.
The development of the rules of evidence has resulted in waning support for these privileges, especially the testimonial privilege.3 8 Prior restrictions have been modified by exceptions to both the testimonial3 9 and
communications 40 privileges. The courts have also been more inclined to
find waivers.
privilege, said the court, continues beyond the end of the marriage. 583 S.W.2d
at 177.
34. The courts require that the spouses be lawfully married. See State v. Shreve,
137 Mo. 1, 38 S.W. 548 (1897); State v. Moore, 61 Mo. 276 (1875). Predictably,
this has led to disputes over what is a lawful marriage. The Missouri Supreme Court
has recognized that a common law wife cannot be compelled to testify against her
husband. State v. Harris, 283 Mo. 99, 109, 222 S.W. 420, 423 (1920), overruledon
other grounds, State v. Carson, 299 Mo. 367, 252 S.W. 688 (1923). In a prosecution
for bigamy, the defendant can exclude his first wife's testimony. State v. Ulrich,
110 Mo. 350, 364, 19 S.W. 656, 660 (1892). Testimony of the second wife, however,
has been allowed. State v. Shreve, 137 Mo. 1, 5, 38 S.W. 548, 549 (1897). See
generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 423 (1980).
35. See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1894) (husband charged with attempt to kill wife); State v. Bean, 104 Mo. App. 255, 78 S.W.
640 (St. L. 1904) (husband charged with abandonment). But cf.State v. Vaughan,
136 Mo. App. 645, 118 S.W. 1186 (K.C. 1909) (wife not competent when husband
charged with disturbing her peace).
36. Consent may be either explicit or implicit. Implicit consent occurs when
the defendant calls his spouse to the stand. The prosecution has the right to crossexamine, though it may not go beyond the scope of direct examination. State v.
Emrich, 361 Mo. 922, 927, 237 S.W.2d 169, 173 (1951); State v. Black, 360 Mo.
261, 270, 227 S.W.2d 1006, 1012 (1950). The testimony of the witness-spouse may
also be impeached by prior inconsistent statements. State v. Mayberry, 360 Mo.
35, 41, 226 S.W.2d 725, 729 (1950).
37. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 586 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979).
38. Scholarly criticism of the testimonial privilege has been intensive. See, e.g.,
Orfield, The Husband-Wife Privilegesin FederalCourt, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 144, 164-65
(1963) (advocating abolition of testimonial privilege); Rothstein, A Re-evaluation of
the PrivilegeAgainst Adverse Spousal Testimony in Light of Its Purpose, 12 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1186, 1194-95 (1963) (advocating balancing test). Wigmore, who finds little
fault with the communications privilege, refers to the testimonial privilege as "the
merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice." 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2228.
39. See State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855, 864 (Mo. En Banc 1957) (injury to spouse's child waived testimonial privilege).
40. Missouri courts have recognized three separate exceptions to the communications privilege. First, no privilege is available when the spouses have formed
an agency relationship. Darrier v. Darrier, 58 Mo. 222, 234 (1874). Second, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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State v. Bledsoe4 1 is representative of the decisions expanding waiver. In
Bledsoe, the defendant was accused of murdering his wife's parents. During
the trial, he revealed confidential communications from his wife concerning her extra-marital affairs. 42 His wife countered with testimony adverse
to his case which contained confidential communications he had made to
her. 43 The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that since the defendant had
blackened his wife's reputation by revealing confidential communications,
44
he had waived his marital privileges.
The language of Bledsoe is ambiguous. It is unclear from the decision
whether the court found one waiver for both privileges or separate waivers
for each. Clearly, the defendant's revelation of confidential communications
waived the communications privilege. 45 This is a settled rule of law. 46 The
court may also have held that waiver of the communications privilege by
necessity waived the testimonial privilege. As a practical matter, waiver of
the communications privilege would be useless if the witness-spouse could
47
be prevented from speaking under the testimonial privilege.
Throughout the decision, however, the court alluded to the defendant's
blackening of his spouse's reputation. 48 The court noted that the defendant's
testimony had destroyed "the peace, confidence, and tranquility of his
privilege does not apply when the issue is fraud on marital property rights. Henry
v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407,421, 12 S.W. 663, 667 (1889). Third, the privilege does not
apply when the spouses are engaged in ajoint business venture. Durr v. Vick, 345
S.W.2d 165, 168 (Mo. 1961). See generally Comment, Confidential Communications
Privilegeof Husbandand Wife: Application Under the MissouriDissolutionStatute, 43 MO.
L. REV. 235 (1978).
41. 325 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1959).
42. Id. at 765.
43. Id. at 766. Although not raised by the defendant on appeal, his wife's
testimony apparently went beyond the scope of his statements blackening her reputation. Id. Thus, a waiver of the testimonial privilege apparently is a total waiver and
is not limited to a rebuttal of the defendant's statements. This idea of total waiver
is in accord with the belief that waiver of the testimonial privilege in itself means
that the marriage at issue is already seriously damaged, and full disclosure will cause
no further harm.
44. Id. at 767.
45. The scope of this waiver has not been clearly defined in Missouri. It is
not settled, for example, whether a defendant's revelation of some communications
should waive the privilege for all communications.
46. State v. St. John, 94 Mo. App. 229, 235, 68 S.W. 374, 376 (St. L. 1902);
White v. State, 268 P.2d 310, 313 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
47. Assume, for example, that the defendant-spouse has revealed confidential communications during his testimony. This waives the communications
privilege and his spouse can testify as to confidential communications. Unless the
testimonial privilege is also waived, however, the witness-spouse cannot testify to
anything that is adverse to the defendant's cause. Unless the testimonial privilege
is waived along with the communications privilege, the waiver of the communications privilege is useless.
48. 325 S.W.2d at 766-67.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/12
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marriage.' ' 4 This reasoning comports with the rationale behind the
testimonial privilege, that it is the defendant's own marriage that must be
protected.5 0 Bledsoe may be read as holding that blackening the spouse's
reputation independently waives the testimonial privilege,5 1 while revealing confidential communications waives the communications privilege.
As a foundation to its analysis, the Pendergrascourt apparently interpreted
Bledsoe as establishing that the testimonial privilege is waived when one spouse
blackens the reputation of the other. 52 This is an acceptable interpretation
of the case, and one that is properly within the rationale of the testimonial
privilege.53 The court departed from Bledsoe, however, in apparently ruling that a defendant's communications privilege is waived when he waives
his testimonial privilege by blackening his spouse's reputation.5 4 In reaching
this result, the court stated that it was irrelevant whether any confidential
communications were revealed by the defendant.5 5 The court did not find
56
any independent waiver of the communications privilege.
The reasoning of the Pendergrascourt is difficult to understand. Although
it is possible to read Bledsoe as controlling the outcome in Pendergras,that interpretation requires reading into Bledsoe a rule of law that is unnecessary
under the facts of that case 5 7 and which is inconsistent with existing case law
49. Id. at 766.
50. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
51. There are few cases supporting this proposition. None of the cases cited
in Bledsoe dealt with a waiver of the testimonial privilege based on blackening of
the witness-spouse's reputation. See cases cited 325 S.W.2d at 767. There is also
little support for this in otherjurisdictions. In People v. Worthington, 38 Cal. App.
3d 359, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1974), however, the court held that the defendant
waived his testimonial privilege when he accused his wife of the murder for which
he was being tried. Id. at 365, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 326. This case does not directly
support the argument that blackening a spouse's reputation waives the testimonial
privilege, however, because the defendant also revealed confidential communications. Id.
52. Significantly, if the Bledsoe court based its waiver of both marital privileges
on the defendant's revelation of confidential communications, which is one possible interpretation of the case, it does not support the holding in Pendergras.
53. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
54. 621 S.W.2d at 71.
55. Id. This conclusion is supported by the substantial number of confidential
communications contained in the wife's testimony. See note 9 supra. In fact, a large
portion of the state's brief on appeal dealt with these communications. Brief for
Respondent at 13-17, Pendergras.While the court noted that it might have disposed
of the case by finding that the defendant had himself revealed confidential communications, it declined to do so. 621 S.W.2d at 71. The court's failure to use any
other waiver theory for confidential communications indicates that it believed that
waiver of the testimonial privilege also waived the communications privilege.
56. 621 S.W.2d at 71-72.
57. Bledsoe dealt with a situation where the defendant attacked his own marriage while simultaneously revealing confidential communications. State v. Bledsoe, 325 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Mo. 1959). Revelation of confidential communications
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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58
on the subject.
Because the privileges are not related, there is no conceptual reason why
a waiver of one privilege should automatically affect the other. Although
practicality suggests that a waiver of the communications privilege should
also waive the testimonial privilege, 59 there is no such necessity when the
testimonial privilege is the one waived. It is possible, and entirely within
the rationale of the communications privilege, to allow the witness-spouse
to testify as to anything except confidential communications.
Pendergras is inconsistent with the purpose of the communications
privilege, which is to protect the institution of marriage. 60 Courts that
recognize this purpose have consistently refused to waive the privilege even
though the particular marriage at issue has ended. 6' This new waiver created
62
in Pendergras is in opposition to established law.

The effects of Pendergrascould be extensive. In many instances, the family
home and car are exclusively within the control of the husband and wife.
When one spouse is charged with possession of narcotics found in the home
or car, a denial of guilt would itself heavily implicate the other. This alone
might be sufficient to waive both the defendant's testimonial and communica-

tions privileges .63
is an accepted method of waiving this privilege. See note 46 supra. Unlike the
Pendergras case, there was no need for the Bledsoe court to find that waiver of the
testimonial privilege also waived the communications privilege, because Bledsoe
had already waived that privilege in a more traditional manner.
58. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); State v. Euell,
583 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. En Banc 1979). Both of these cases carefully distinguish
between the communications and testimonial privileges. See also Wolfe v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 15 (1934) (acknowledging privilege for confidential communications in federal courts); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2334.
59. See note 47 supra.
60. See 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2232.
61. See, e.g., O'Neill v. O'Neill, 264 S.W. 61 (Mo. App., St. L. 1924) (communications privilege applied in divorce action).
62. Although not discussed by the court, some support for the Pendergrasdecision can be found by analogy in cases involving other communications privileges.
For example, Missouri recognizes an attorney-client communications privilege. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1978). When a client alleges that an attorney is incompetent, the privilege is no longer available to the client. See Venari v. State, 474 S.W.2d
833 (Mo. 1971); Lansdown v. State, 472 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1971). Thus, when a
client blackens his attorney's reputation, he waives his communications privilege.
Although this appears somewhat similar to the situation in Pendergras,the two
situations may be distinguished. Waiver of the attorney-client privilege requires
that there be a point of contention between the two parties, e.g., a malpractice suit
or a motion to set aside a verdict for ineffective assistance of counsel. This requirement that the parties be adversaries draws the attorney-client waiver closer to the
common law exception for necessity, see cases cited note 35 supra, than the situation in Pendergras,though it can be argued that the question of which spouse was
guilty made the defendant and his spouse adversaries to some extent.
63. Another problem that arises is coercion of the witness-spouse. In both
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/12
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Pendergrasmay also have an effect on civil ligitation. Although there is
no testimonial privilege in civil cases, there is a communications privilege
64
identical to that in criminal cases.
The change in marital privileges by Pendergras may or may not be
desirable. 65 It is obviously undesirable to withhold valuable evidence from
a jury or to allow defendants to commit perjury, unafraid of contrary
testimony from their spouses. But there are compelling and logical reasons
why some relationships require a degree of confidentiality to foster the utmost trust between the parties. Depending on what factors are stressed, the
ultimate effect of Pendergras,restricting the scope of privileged evidence, can
easily be justified.
Unfortunately, the Pendergrascourt did not discuss these factors. Instead,
the court's ambiguous decision has left an uncertain area of the law even
more confusing. For the practitioner who must decide what conduct is sufficient to waive his client's marital privilege, Pendergras provides little
guidance.
BRUCE E. CLARK
Pendergrasand Trammel, pressure was applied to the witness-spouse to obtain her
testimony for the prosecution. In Trammel, another narcotics case, the spouse was
promised lenient treatment in exchange for her testimony. Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 43 (1980). In Pendergras,the witness-spouse testified at a hearing for a new trial that the prosecutor "told her she was implicated very heavily
and that if Defendant was acquitted everyone would assume that she was guilty and
she might lose custody of her daughter." Brief for Appellant at 7, Pendergras.
64. See MO. REV. STAT. § 491.020 (1978).
65. The arguments in favor of the privilege are well established. See notes 31-33
and accompanying text supra. An argument against the privilege is that it does little to insure the privacy of marriage because few people know about it. See Hutchins
& Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law ofEvidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L.
REV. 675, 682 (1929). Criticism of the testimonial privilege is louder and more extensive. See note 38 supra. The thrust of the criticism is that the testimonial privilege
provides little, if any, social benefit but creates the potential for great individual
harm because it violates the fundamental principle that all relevant information
should be presented at trial. See Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husbandand Wife in
California, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 390, 410-14 (1931).
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